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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the release of liability signed by Mr.

Pearce barred his claims against the Utah Athletic Foundation except for gross negligence?
PRESERVATION: This issue was briefed by the parties in the memorandum and
reply memorandum in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 100-112,
164-167), and in the plaintiffs opposition to the motion (R. 134-146).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's interpretation of a contract is a
question of law reviewed de novo. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const, Inc., 1999 UT 69, 983
P.2d 575.
2.

Did the trial court err in ruling that no genuine issue of material fact existed as

to whether UAF was grossly negligent?
PRESERVATION: This issue was briefed by the parties in the memorandum and
reply memorandum in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 112-117,
169-172), and in the plaintiffs opposition to the motion (R. 146-150).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's determination that no genuine issue of
material fact existed is a question of law reviewed de novo. Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Const,
Inc., 1999 UT 69, 983 P.2d 575.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES OR REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of, or of central importance to, the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This action arises out of an injury that plaintiff James Pearce allegedly suffered
during a bobsled ride. On May 10, 2004, plaintiff filed an action against the operator of
the bobsled track, the Utah Athletic Foundation (UAF), alleging negligence. (R. 1.) On
February 25, 2005, plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, alleging negligence, gross
negligence, and breach of warranty against the UAF. (R. 52.)
On May 2, 2006, the UAF filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the plaintiffs claims were barred because (1) he had signed a release of liability that
barred all claims for negligence, (2) there was insufficient evidence in the record to
maintain a claim of gross negligence; and (3) he could not maintain a claim for breach of
warranty. (R. 84A, R. 91.)
After oral argument, the court issued a Ruling and Order granting the motion for
summary judgment on September 14, 2006. (R. 181.) Plaintiff filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R. 198.)
Facts
In connection with its motion for summary judgment, the UAF submitted a
detailed statement of undisputed facts consisting of 112 paragraphs. (R. 92-108.) With
2

few exceptions, Pearce did not dispute those facts. The uncontroverted facts in the case,
taking into account plaintiffs objections, are as follows:1
In the 1990s, Salt Lake City learned that it would be hosting the 2002 Winter
Olympics. One of the facilities constructed by the State of Utah for the event was a
sliding facility in Park City, a refrigerated track that hosted bobsled, luge, and skeleton
competitions, training, and public use operations. (R. 92 f 5; R. 93 f 10.) (There are
eleven or twelve such refrigerated tracks in the world.

Three are located in North

America in former Winter Olympics host cities (Park City, Calgary, and Lake Placid).
(R. 93 U 8.))
The sport of bobsled involves sliding down a curvy, ice-covered track in a sled at
speeds of up to 80 miles per hour. The Park City bobsled track weaves its way through a
rugged mountain environment. (R. 92ffif2, 4; R. 94ffl[17-18.)
For the Park City track, the State hired as the general contractor Okland
Construction, who undertook the actual construction. The State hired Van Boerman &
Frank, an engineering firm, to engineer and design the track. Numerous subcontractors
and firms were involved with the track's technical design, including concrete and
refrigeration contractors. The State's Division of Facilities Construction also had input
into the design of the track. (R. 93,fflj13-14; R. 94ffif15-16.)

1

In this statement of facts, the UAF has eliminated language to which Pearce objected in
the court below.

3

The track had to be designed to specific, international standards in order to qualify
and be approved for Olympic use. Among the mandated features were specific slope and
curve requirements, including at least 14 curves and a "labyrinth" section. (R. 94fflf1718.) The Olympic design criteria also limited the track's G-forces, specifying that a
competitor could not be subjected to more than 5 Gs for more than 1.5 to 2.5 seconds.
(R. 94 Tf 19.) As the plaintiff, a mechanical engineer by education and employment,
explained, G-forces represent a multiplier of gravity, with 1 G equal to the force of
gravity. (R. 91 Exh. A, pp. 16, 18, 68-69.)
For a sliding facility to be certified, the Federation Internationale de Bobsleigh et
de Tobaganning ("FIBT"), the "supreme authority" in all matters relating to international
bobsleigh and skeleton, undertakes a "homologization" process wherein a committee
ensures that the track is built as it was designed, and that the design meets the
engineering criteria. The process involves a series of measurements via survey, tape
measure, and inclinometer, verifying that the track meets specifications. As part of its
review, FIBT also conducted additional tests by running bobsleds and other sliding
devices down the track. The track's curves were tested to ensure that the concrete was
smooth. (R. 94 % 20; R. 95,ffl|21-23.)
The Park City track was completed in 1996, after which the ownership and
operation were transferred to the Salt Lake Organizing Committee. (R. 92 If 6; R. 93 %
11.) In early 1997, the Park City track was opened to the public, and the Public Ride
Program (hereinafter referred to as "PRP") began operations. (R. 93 ^ 7.)

4

Several years later, the 2002 Winter Olympics arrived. Two of the spectators at
the Olympics were plaintiff James Pearce and his wife. Pearce was a Wyoming resident
with a home in Park City, Utah. He graduated from college with a degree in mechanical
engineering, has been employed as an engineer since 1970 or 1971, and was licensed as a
professional engineer until the early 1990s. (R. 103 f 82; R. 103ffl[77-79.) Pearce and
his family were active sports enthusiasts, participating in snowmobiling, cross country
skiing, alpine skiing, gym exercises, golfing, water skiing, bike riding, walking, and
ballooning, among other activities. (R. 103 U 80; R. 1291f 80.)
During the Olympics, Pearce and his wife attended ski jumping and luge events at
the Olympic Park. The luge competition was held on the same track as the bobsled ride
at issue in this case. As a spectator, Pearce walked up to the site from the parking area
and walked along the side of the track to view the luge event. (R. 103 1f 82; R. 104fflf8384.)
After the Olympics, the Utah Athletic Foundation assumed ownership and
operation of the Park City track. (R. 92 ^ 3; R. 93 ^ 12.) At the time of Pearce's
accident, Craig Lehto was General Manager of the UAF. Mr. Lehto had been recruited
by the State in 1996 to serve as the track manager for the Park City facility. He had
previously been the manager of the Canadian Olympic Park, with duties including the
initiation, development, and operation of Calgary's track and its Public Ride Program.
(R.96f34;R.97f 35.)

5

Operation of the Park City track involves multiple layers of coordination and
control, including a general manager, a director of operations, control tower operators,
track technicians/crew, start leaders, a passenger supervisor, full-time bobsled
technicians, and a safety/compliance coordinator. (R. 95 f 25.)
The track operates six days per week and may have up to eight track workers
providing maintenance throughout the day. Track maintenance is constant from the time
the track is activated in mid-October until the end of March, including repairs to the ice
surface and sled maintenance. Repairing the ice includes filling in the low points on the
track with a snow and water mixture, scraping, and smoothing the ice surface. A fulltime sled technician inspects and repairs the bobsleds, including those utilized in the
Public Ride Program. (R. 96ffi[26-30.)
Prior to any sliding session, the track is inspected and cleared by a certified track
worker, who walks the track from top to bottom, checking the condition of the ice and
every shade, strap, and other appurtenant equipment. Only after conducting this thorough
inspection is the track deemed ready and available. The track is re-inspected and recleared any time there is more than a 20-minute gap in sled activity. (R. 96ffl[31-33.)
Although the Public Ride Program had been open for several years when the UAF
assumed operation, prior to its continuance the UAF effectuated "operational diligence"
to assess the appropriateness of the program and to better understand the program itself.
(R. 97 ^f 37.) Part of that diligence included conversations with bobsled drivers about "a
range of things. Everything . . . ," including helmets, where to deliver information about

6

the ride to passengers, and many logistical issues. (R. 97 f 38; R. 127 f 38; R. 91 Exh. C,
p. 36 lines 1-15.)
The UAF did not do any testing independent of that conducted by FIBT and other
entities involved with the construction, design, engineering, and certification of the track.
Neither the Lake Placid nor the Calgary tracks conducted additional testing or
certification prior to operation of their public ride programs. (R. 95 ^ 24; R. 97 ^f 39-40;
R. I271f39).
The UAF's bobsleds are configured for a driver and three passengers behind the
driver. Unlike competition bobsleds, Public Ride Program sleds allow the driver to
control the braking. Additionally, the sleds have "fins" on the side to protect passengers
in the event of a rollover and to reduce speed. PRP sleds also have interior handles for
passengers. The modified sleds were manufactured by Podar; the UAF had no input into
their design. (R. 97 H 41, R. 98 fj| 42-43; R. 161-162 % 26.)
The UAF employs professional, World Cup-level drivers for the Public Ride
Program. The sleds launch from the top of the track at the designated bobsled/skeleton
start. (To put a four-person bobsled into the track at a lower start location is theoretically
possible but not practical. If the bobsleds start at locations below the top of the track, the
sled will not reach the correct finish location as they cannot carry enough speed through
the corners.) (R. 98ffl|44-45; R. 98 f 46.)
The UAF developed written policies and procedures for the Public Ride Program,
including a Passenger Ride Program Lead Perspective, which served to inform and train
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UAF employees about the nature and operation of the program.

Employees'

responsibilities, logistical information, and operational considerations are all addressed in
the written document. (R. 98,ffif47-49; R. 91, Exh. G.)
UAF employees were also provided with a written document addressing common
questions from patrons.

In addition to serving as a resource for UAF employees,

"Frequently Asked Questions about Bobsled Rides" was provided to public ride
passengers if they had a question concerning the program. (R. 99 ^ 50; R. 91 Exh. H.)
At the end of each season, the UAF reviews Public Ride Program operations,
including injury information. The medical patrol director also prepares monthly reports
regarding incidents/injuries and reviews such reports with the medical patrol manager.
The injury reports, including statistics from the PRP, are reported to the Utah Olympic
Park General Manager. (R. 103 fflf 73-75.) On one occasion, after reviewing incident
reports, it was determined that the ice on the track was rough and that such condition
might have contributed to an incident. To address that concern, the track crew did some
maintenance on the track, smoothing out the ice surface in spots. (R. 103 Tf 76.)
In developing the Public Ride Program, the UAF held discussions concerning the
information that was necessary to be conveyed to the public before they went down the
track. Drivers, supervisors, and others involved with the operation of the track were
involved in the development of the orientation information.

UAF personnel also

"networked" with their counterparts in Lake Placid and Calgary regarding their PRP
operations. (R. 99 Tf 51-53.)

8

In 2003, the plaintiffs son, Steven Pearce, expressed a desire to ride the bobsled at
the Utah Olympic Park, and plaintiffs wife made a reservation for him to ride on his
own. Later, Pearce decided that if there was an available spot to ride the bobsled, he
would sign up as well, thinking it would be a fun, exciting thing to do with his son. (R.
104fflf85-86.) On February 27, 2003, he and his son drove to the Olympic Park.
Before being allowed to ride the bobsled, Public Ride Program participants are
required to attend an orientation, which includes both video and oral presentations.
Pearce alleges that his orientation session lasted about fifteen minutes. (R. 99 ^ 54; R.
128 K 54.) The video presentation showed the bobsled course and bobsleds going down
the track, with a narrative that informed the participants of the nature and risks associated
with the ride. (R. 99 % 56; R. 109 H 94.)
The oral orientation program (PRP Rider Orientation protocol) was memorialized
in writing, to serve as a guide for the UAF employees involved in the orientation process.
The presentation is delivered by a UAF employee who works off a "script" or checklist
of information. (R. 991f 55; R. 91 Exh. I; R. 100fflf57-58; R. 91 Exh. J.)
The orientation informs Public Ride Passengers of the speed of the bobsled, the Gforces involved, what to do if the bobsled rolls over, how to fit the helmet, risks
associated with certain health conditions such as back injuries, neck injuries, and
pregnancy, the violence of the ride itself, and the option not to ride if one feels
apprehensive or reluctant.

The oral orientation includes an express warning that
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passengers with back, neck, or spine problems should not participate in the bobsled ride.
(R. 100 K 60; R. 106198.)
As part of the orientation, Pearce was told that the ride was "high G forces," "the
most exciting roller coaster ride you've been on." The bobsled was described as a
"thrilling ride, fast ride, exciting ride, it was an aggressive ride," or words to that effect.
(R. 91 Exh. A, pp. 67-68, 87; R. 106ffi[95-96.) As an engineer, Pearce understood the
meaning of high G-forces, a "high, you know, gravity, multiplier of gravity. . . . A G
force, if you have a one-pound object sitting on that table and it is subjected to four Gs, it
will have an equivalent force to four pounds." (R. 106 U 97; R. 91 Exh. A, pp. 68-69.)
After the orientation, Pearce was required to sign a release if he wanted to ride the
bobsled. (R. 101ffi[61-62; R. 91 Exh. L; R. 156 Exh. A, p. 33.) A copy of the release
used during the 2002-03 season is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B.2
Pearce "looked at it. I knew it was a release. . . . It was typical of releases on the
back of your parking ticket." He did not have any questions regarding the document, but
alleges that he did not understand that it would release the UAF from liability from its
own negligence. (R. 91 Exh. A, p. 65; R. 105 Iffl 92-93; R. 129 U 92.)
The release signed by Pearce is less than one page in length.

It is titled

"AGREEMENT TO USE FACILITIES OF OLYMPIC PARKS OF UTAH."
Immediately below the title, it states:

"IMPORTANT:

2

THIS IS A LEGAL

The parties were unable to locate the original release that Mr. Pearce signed. However,
it is undisputed that he signed a copy of the release attached as Addendum Exh. B.
10

DOCUMENT. PLEASE READ IN FULL AND UNDERSTAND BEFORE SIGNING."
(R.91Exh.L.)
The release begins with this language in bold print:
You/your minor child may be hurt using the facilities and equipment of the
Olympic Parks of Utah, which include the Utah Olympic Park, the Utah Olympic
Oval and Soldier Hollow ("the Sports facilities"). If you are unwilling to assume
all the risks of your/your minor child's use of the Sports Facilities, DO NOT sign
this document, in which case you/your minor child will NOT be authorized to use
the Sports Facilities, and you will be refunded any monies you paid to use the
Sports Facilities. If you sign this document BUT make any alterations to it, you
are NOT authorized to use the Sports Facilities.
(R.91Exh.L.) 3
The release then sets forth three numbered paragraphs. The middle paragraph
provides consent to medical treatment, use of images, etc. The other paragraphs state
(with emphasis in the original):
1.
Assumptions of Risks. I, for myself . . . wish to use the Sports
Facilities and may engage in one or more sports, including without
limitation: . . . bobsled . . . . I understand that the Sports are high-speed
action and adventure sports that involve many inherent risks and dangers
and that using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports may put
me . . . at risk of serious injury or illness. These dangers include but are not
limited to: . . . risk-creating weather conditions and variations in terrain;
accidents by other users of the Sports Facilities; failure to follow safely
procedures, or to stay within ability or control; limits or defects in the
Sports Facilities. I am also aware that hazards may exist throughout the
Sports Facilities, may be unmarked and occur without warning, and that
helmets, safety equipment, proficiency checks, supervision and
enforcement of rules do not and cannot guarantee my . . . safety. I . . . am
able to perform the essential functions required to use the Sports Facilities
and participate in the Sports and I am freely and voluntarily participating in
the Sports and the use of the Sports Facilities. I REPRESENT AND
3

Most of the ellipses in the quotations that follow are references to "minor child"
following "you," "I," or "my."
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WARRANT THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THIS
DOCUMENT, AM OF SOUND MIND, HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY,
AND FREELY ACCEPT AND FULLY ASSUME THE RISK THAT I . ..
CAN SUFFER PROPERTY DAMAGE, ILLNESS, SEVERE PERSONAL
INJURY OR EVEN DEATH BY USING THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR
PARTICIPATING IN THE SPORTS, not only the ways described above,
but also in ways that are unknown and unexpected, even if I follow . . .
instructions or advice.
*

*

*

3.
Waiver, Release and Indemnification. I understand and agree that
the UAF is not an insurer of my conduct. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT
PERMITTED BY LAW, I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, COVENANT
NOT TO SUE, AND DISCHARGE THE UAF . . . FROM ANY AND
ALL LIABILITY, CLAIMS, DEMANDS, AND CAUSES OF ACTION
WHATSOEVER ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO ANY LOSS,
DAMAGE, OR INJURY, INCLUDING DEATH, THAT MAY BE
SUSTAINED BY ME . . . OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ANY
PROPERTY BELONGING TO ME . . . WHETHER CAUSED BY THE
NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE, ARISING OUT OF
OR RELATED TO MY . . . USE OF THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR
PARTICIPATION IN THE SPORTS, THAT I WILL INDEMNIFY THE
RELEASEES AGAINST SUCH CLAIMS, INCLUDING PAYMENT OF
ATTORNEY FEES. I AGREE THAT THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BIND
MY GUARDIAN, ASSIGNS, HEIRS, ADMINISTRATORS AND
EXECUTORS FOREVER.
See Addendum Exh. B. A signature line follows, along with a line for emergency contact
information.
Pearce understood at that point that he was free not to go on the bobsled ride.
After the orientation, he and his son waited until the various groups of passengers were
called out to the start platform and bobsled assignments were made. He was then given a
helmet and told how to fit it. (R. 106ffl[100-103.)
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On the starting platform, UAF start leaders again inform PRP passengers of the
risks of the ride, including that speeds may reach 82 miles per hour, and that they may
experience up to 5 G-forces. They again instruct patrons not to ride if they have a bad
back or recent surgery. (R. 101 ffl[ 63-65.) Start leaders also reiterate that the Public
Ride Program is a voluntary ride and that the passenger may forego the ride and receive a
refund. (R. 101 f 66; R. 106 HH 101-101.)
UAF personnel have been told by their drivers that the fourth position is "more
intense" and that passengers in the fourth position "feel" the ride more. General laws of
physics indicate that with any moving object, there is a transfer of weight to the rear
position in the sled. (R. 101 If 67; R. 102 ^ 68-69.) Pearce denies being aware that the
rear position would experience greater G-forces than other seats.4
The start leaders and the driver review the physique of the prospective passengers
and decide who looks the strongest for placement in the fourth position. The start leaders
and drivers then place the passengers into the second, third, and fourth positions behind
the driver. (R. 101 f 67; R. 102 U 71.)
Before positioning Pearce and the other passengers, a UAF employee asked Pearce
if he had a strong back. Pearce said that he does not recall his exact response, but, "I told
her I don't know how to answer that. I said I think so, but I don't know how to answer
that, or something to that effect." His son testified that Pearce responded "something to

4

According to Pearce's son Steven, PRP officials stated before the ride that, with respect
to G forces, "you would feel it more in seat number four." (R. 160 ^ 70.) Pearce,
however, denies that any such statement was made. (R. 128-129.)
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the effect of, yes, I have a strong back."

The bobsled driver then positioned the

passengers in the bobsled, placing Pearce in the fourth position. (R. 91 Exh. A, p. 83; R.
1071105; R. 129-1301f 105; R. 156 Exh. A, p. 45.)5
The passengers were instructed how to position themselves in the bobsled while it
went down the track. Pearce was instructed to lean slightly forward, put his hands
through the handles, shrug his shoulders to hold the stability of his head, and compress
through the curves. (R. 102 ^ 72.) He testified that he was told to lean forward "because
we don't want your head - you know, we don't want you falling backwards out of the
sled, and there was no back on the sled." (R. 91 Exh. A, p. 87.)
During the ride, Pearce suffered a lumbar burst fracture of his back. His injury
was caused entirely by the G-forces of the ride; no collision or tipping occurred. (R. 1; R.
125.) There is no evidence that the ride generated G-forces greater than the 5 that UAF
had warned of before the ride.
In his Amended Complaint, Pearce alleged three causes of action against the UAF:
First, he alleged negligence resulting from the UAF's breach of duty in failing to know
that the greatest force is on the last rider in the bobsled; failing to equip the bobsled with
a small backrest for the last rider; failing to use an alternative starting point for the
bobsleds; failing to eliminate the last riding position; failing to adequately inform the

5

Unfortunately, plaintiff had, in fact, suffered from back problems prior to February
2003, including a ruptured disk in 1997. On one occasion about ten years earlier,
Pearce's back problem had been severe enough that he was flat on his back in bed. (R.
107 K 107; R. 130 TI130.)
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public of the risks associated with the bobsled; and failing to discover the risks associated
with the fourth position. (R.l 1fl[ 9-22.)
Second, Pearce alleged gross negligence resulting from the UAF's failure to
undertake any testing, inspections, or analysis to determine the risks to the riders in the
last seat; not ensuring that patrons were warned of the risks of riding in the last seat; and
failing to realize the strong probability of harm that could result to the public by not
taking steps to discover the risk of injury to riders in the last seat. (R.lfflf24-33.)
Third, Pearce alleged breach of warranty. His brief on appeal does not challenge
the dismissal of his warranty claim. Consequently, the claim is not addressed herein.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly held that the exculpatory waiver signed by James Pearce
before he was went on the bobsled ride precludes his negligence claims against the UAF.
This Court has consistently held that, as long as such a waiver is clear and unequivocal, it
is enforceable and serves to bar claims for simple negligence.
The release in this case satisfies the test. It is short. It emphasizes the critical
language with underlining and capital letters. Paragraph 3 expressly releases "any and
all" claims, "whether caused by the negligence of releasees or otherwise." Pearce's claim
that the release is ambiguous because Paragraph 1 (which discusses assumptions of risks)
does not also mention "negligence" ignores the plain language of the contract. His claim
that he did not understand the full import of the release is immaterial where its language
is unambiguous.
In arguing that he should nonetheless be allowed to avoid the release because it is
unconscionable, Pearce bears a heavy burden. No substantive unconscionability can be
shown, because the content of the agreement is not "so one-sided as to oppress an
innocent party." As a long line of cases from this Court demonstrates, the mere fact that
a contract discharges liability for one party's negligence does not make it oppressive.
Nor was there any procedural unconscionability—Pearce was free at all times to reject
the release and forego the bobsled ride. Instead, he chose to sign a release of "any and
all" claims, broad language that covered all forms of simple negligence that occurred,
whether named in the release or not.
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Pearce9 s next argument that the release is void as against public policy is not
supported by Utah law. Contracts are, by their nature, supposed to produce predictable
results. It is a strong public policy of this state that persons who enter into unambiguous
contracts are bound by what they sign. The alternative standard urged by Pearce would
essentially render all exculpatory waivers meaningless, because they could be avoided by
simply alleging that the released party negligently failed to discover or disclose a
particular danger. Any such restriction on an entire class of contracts should be left to the
legislature, not the courts, particularly as the Utah legislature has chosen not to regulate
exculpatory waivers except in very limited circumstances.
Policy considerations militate against the case-by-case enforcement of contracts,
as would result if the Court applied the factors set forth in Tunkl v. Regents of the
University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963) to every waiver. As most
courts conclude, public policy should not be invoked to invalidate an otherwise
enforceable waiver unless the activity in question affects the public interest.
The trial court was also correct in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact
exists with respect to whether the UAF was grossly negligent. As a matter of law, and in
light of the undisputed actions undertaken by the UAF to make its Public Ride Program
safe, the few alleged missteps cited by Pearce do not rise to the level of gross negligence.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PEARCE'S
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY THE RELEASE.6

A.

The Waiver, Release and Indemnification agreement executed by Pearce

bars his negligence claims.
The ability of adults to allocate risks among themselves by contract, including the
waiver of claims for future negligence, has been repeatedly recognized in this state for
half a century. See Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901, 905 (Utah App. 1995);
Krauss v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993); Zollman v. Myers, 797 F.Supp. 923, 927 (D. Utah 1992);
Palmer v. Davis, 808 P.2d 128, 132 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991);
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 371-72 (Utah 1990); Pickhover v.
Smith's Management Corp., Ill P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); Simonson v. Travis, 728 P.2d 999, 1002 (Utah 1986); DCR Inc. v.
Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1983); Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal
Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983); DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 824-25
(Utah 1978); Union Pac. R.R. v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 568 P.2d 724, 725-26
(Utah 1977); Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 18 Utah 2d 263, 265, 420 P.2d 848, 849
(1966); Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 17 Utah 2d 255,260, 408 P.2d 910,

6

Pearce's brief begins with the issue of whether he adduced sufficient evidence to raise
an issue of fact as to gross negligence. While the UAF agrees that this is the dispositive
issue on appeal, it seems logical to address the effect of the release on Pearce's
negligence claims first.
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913-14 (1965); Walker Bank and Trust Company v. First Security Corporation, 341 P.2d
944, 947 (Utah 1959).
As this Court noted in Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, 37 P.3d 1062:
The rule regarding releases, to which the district court and Russ referred, is stated
as a general principle of the common law in 6A Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts, § 1472, at 596-97 (1962):
It is generally held that those who are not engaged in public service may
properly bargain against liability for harm caused by their ordinary
negligence in performance of contractual duty; but such an exemption is
always invalid if it applies to harm wilfully inflicted or caused by gross or
wanton negligence.
Thus, most courts allow release of liability for prospective negligence, except
where there is a strong public interest in the services provided.
Id., f 9. See also 8 Williston on Contracts § 19:22 (4th ed.) ("Because certain agreements
are affected with a public interest, exculpation clauses contained in them are not
enforceable, but when the public interest is not implicated, private parties are free among
themselves to shift a risk through the use of an exculpatory provision"); W. Page Keeton,
et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68 (5th ed.).
While courts generally refrain from interfering with individuals' freedom to
contract, they are also uncomfortable with the notion of disclaiming liability for one's
own negligence. The Court has reconciled these competing concerns by imposing special
restrictions on exculpatory waivers that are not applied to other contracts: such waivers
are strictly construed against the released party, and are upheld only when the intent to
release claims for the other party's negligence is clear and unequivocal. See Bishop v.
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Gentec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ^ 19, 48 P.3d 218. The release signed by Pearce satisfies those
requirements.
B.

The release unambiguously bars all claims for negligence.

Whether language in a release is clear and unequivocal is a question of law.
Interwest Construction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1358-1359 (Utah 1996). The district
court correctly concluded that the release in Pearce's release meets this test.
The release is less than one page long. It is prefaced with a reminder that it is a
legal document, and that Pearce should read it in full and understand it before signing it.
The opening sentence warns Pearce that he "may be hurt using the facilities and
equipment" of the UAF, and that he will not be allowed on the bobsled ride unless he
agrees to assume "aU the risks" of his use of the facilities. (Emphasis added.) See Gara
v. Woodbridge Tavern, 224 Mich. App. 63, 568 N.W.2d 138, 140 (1997) ("there is no
broader classification than the word 'all.' In its ordinary and natural meaning, the word
'all' leaves no room for exceptions"); Freund, 693 P.2d at 371 (noting broad scope of
words "any and all" in indemnification clause).
Three numbered paragraphs then follow. Each paragraph identifies its subject
with bold, i.e., "1.

Assumptions of risks." and "3.

Waiver, Release and

Indemnification." Some information is underlined, and, when it reaches the signer's
affirmative release of liability, it alerts the reader by switching from regular to capital
letters. See Rawson v. Conover, 2001 UT 24, ^ 52, 20 P.3d 876 (noting that disclaimer
appeared in capital letters).
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1.
Assumptions of Risks. I, for myself . . . wish to use the Sports
Facilities and may engage in one or more sports, including without
limitation: . . . bobsled . . . . I understand that the Sports are high-speed
action and adventure sports that involve many inherent risks and dangers
and that using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports may put
me . . . at risk of serious injury or illness. These dangers include but are not
limited to: . . . risk-creating weather conditions and variations in terrain;
accidents by other users of the Sports Facilities; failure to follow safety
procedures, or to stay within ability or control; limits or defects in the
Sports Facilities. I am also aware that hazards may exist throughout the
Sports Facilities, may be unmarked and occur without warning, and that
helmets, safety equipment, proficiency checks, supervision and
enforcement of rules do not and cannot guarantee my . . . safety. I . . . am
able to perform the essential functions required to use the Sports Facilities
and participate in the Sports and I am freely and voluntarily participating in
the Sports and the use of the Sports Facilities. I REPRESENT AND
WARRANT THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THIS
DOCUMENT, AM OF SOUND MIND, HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY,
AND FREELY ACCEPT AND FULLY ASSUME THE RISK THAT I . . .
CAN SUFFER PROPERTY DAMAGE, ILLNESS, SEVERE PERSONAL
INJURY OR EVEN DEATH BY USING THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR
PARTICIPATING IN THE SPORTS, not only the ways described above,
but also in ways that are unknown and unexpected, even if I follow . . .
instructions or advice.
2.

Consent to Medical Treatment Consent to Use of Images. Etc....

3.
Waiver, Release and Indemnification. I understand and agree that
the UAF is not an insurer of my conduct. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT
PERMITTED BY LAW, I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, COVENANT
NOT TO SUE, AND DISCHARGE THE UAF [AND OTHERS],
COLLECTIVELY "RELEASEES" FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY,
CLAIMS, DEMANDS, AND CAUSES OF ACTION WHATSOEVER
ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO ANY LOSS, DAMAGE, OR
INJURY, INCLUDING DEATH, THAT MAY BE SUSTAINED BY ME .
.. OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ANY PROPERTY BELONGING TO ME
.. . WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES OR
OTHERWISE, ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO MY . . . USE OF
THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR PARTICIPATION IN THE SPORTS,
THAT I WILL INDEMNIFY THE RELEASEES AGAINST SUCH
CLAIMS, INCLUDING PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES. I AGREE
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THAT THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BIND MY GUARDIAN, ASSIGNS,
HEIRS, ADMINISTRATORS AND EXECUTORS FOREVER.
In Paragraph 3, Pearce specifically and unequivocally agreed to release "any and
all liability, claims, demands, and causes of action whatsoever . . . whether caused by the
negligence of releasees or otherwise." (Emphasis added.) It is hard to imagine how the
intent to release claims for negligence could be expressed more clearly, particularly when
the word "negligence" is expressly stated. Russ, 905 P.2d at 905 (word "negligence" is
not required in order to release negligence claims, as long as intent to release such claims
can be clearly implied from language), citing Freund, 793 P.2d at 371-72.
Pearce argues, however, that the release is ambiguous because it allegedly
"preserves negligence claims in Part I but, according to the trial court, waives those
claims in Part III." (Brief of Appellant, pp. 43-46.) This argument fails in its underlying
premise. Nowhere does Paragraph 1 "preserve" negligence claims. In that paragraph,
Pearce acknowledged that he was assuming all inherent risks of participating in the sport,
which were defined as including "failure to follow safety procedures [and] limits or
defects in the Sports Facilities." He was "also aware that hazards may exist throughout
the Sports Facilities, may be unmarked and occur without warning . . . ." Pearce
represented that he "freely accepts and fully assumes the risk that [he] can suffer property
damage, illness, severe personal injury or even death by using the sports facilities or
participating in the sports, not only the ways described above, but also in ways that are
unknown and unexpected . . . . "
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Pearce contends that paragraph 1 did not ask the signer to assume the risk of
UAF's negligence, and therefore it "preserved" negligence claims. (Brief of Appellant,
p. 45; id. at 46 (Paragraph 1 "reserves to the public negligence claims").) However, the
paragraph defines "inherent risks" to include negligent acts, such as failure to follow
safety procedures or defects in the facilities, along with any other unknown or unexpected
way in which injury might occur. Moreover, the absence of the word "negligence" in
Paragraph 1 does not create an ambiguity. See, e.g., Level 3 Communications, LLC, v.
Public Service Commission, 2007 UT App 127, f 16, — P.3d — (fact that agreement
was silent as to effect on particular circumstance "does not alone render the contract
ambiguous. Certainly a contract need not negate every possible construction of its terms
in order to be unambiguous'") (quoting Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir.
1996)).
Pearce9s argument would require the Court to completely ignore other language in
the release, including the opening clause, in which Pearch assumed "all the risks" of the
ride, and Paragraph 3, in which he waived and released "any and all" claims
"whatsoever," "whether caused by the [UAF's] negligence" or not.

Courts do not

disregard language in or rewrite contracts. Bakowski v. Mountain State Steel, Inc., 2002
UT 62, Tf 19, 52 P.3d 1179. Nor will a court "avoid a contract's plain language to achieve
an 'equitable' result." Id.
There simply is no ambiguity in Paragraph 3's intent or wording. Its language is
similar to - indeed, more explicit than - other releases upheld in Utah. In Russ, for
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example, the Court of Appeals addressed a release that held the defendant harmless from
"any and all claims, damages, loss and expenses," "to the fullest extent permitted by
law," for "any death, accident, injury, or other occurrence resulting from visits to the job
site." That language, the court said, met the test of enforceability under Utah law: "The
broad sweep of the provision's language clearly and unequivocally establishes the parties'
intent to avoid [defendant's] potential liability arising from the [plaintiffs] loss or injury
incurred during job site visits." 905 P.2d at 906.
Pearce suggests that he did not study the document carefully and/or did not
understand the full import of what he was signing, but a signer's subjective intent is
immaterial. "A signatory cannot, with hindsight, claim ignorance of the contract and
thereby escape liability." Id. at n.l (citation omitted). "One party to a contract does not
have a duty to ensure that the other has a complete and accurate understanding of all
terms embodied in a written contract." Id. Put simply, a released party "is not required
to show that [the plaintiff] understood the hold harmless provision before [it] asserts the
provision's protection." Id.
C.

The release is not unconscionable.

Pearce argues that the release should not be enforced because it is unconscionable
and/or contrary to public policy. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 31-43.) "A party claiming
unconscionability bears a heavy burden. The law enables parties to freely contract,
establishing terms and allocating risks between them." Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc.,
972 P.2d 395, 402 (Utah 1998). "The law even permits parties to enter into unreasonable
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contracts or contracts leading to a hardship on one party." Id. (citing Bekins Bar V Ranch
v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1983)).
This Court has adopted a two-pronged analysis for determining whether a contract
is unconscionable.

Ryan, 972 P.2d at 402.

The first prong, substantive

unconscionability, focuses on the agreement's contents. The second prong, procedural
unconscionability, focuses on its formation.

In some circumstances, substantive

unconscionability in itself may void a contract; procedural unconscionability by itself
cannot. Id.
Substantive unconscionability cannot be shown by the mere fact that a contract
contains (allegedly) unreasonable terms, or that it is more advantageous to one party than
the other. Id. Courts "will not assume the paternalistic role of declaring that one who
has freely bound himself need not perform because the bargain is not favorable." Bekins,
supra. Rather, "the terms must be so one-sided as to oppress . . . an innocent party."
Ryan, supra, (court's ellipse). That is not present here. While courts have characterized
exculpatory clauses as disfavored in the law, such agreements have consistently been
held valid and enforceable if they are clear and unambiguous.
Procedural unconscionability also cannot be shown. Under this prong, a court
asks "whether there was overreaching by a contracting party occupying an unfairly
superior bargaining position." Ryan, 972 P.2d at 403. UAF did not occupy an unfairly
superior bargaining position. It offered Pearce an opportunity to engage in a recreational
activity if he so desired. As thrilling as the bobsled experience might be, no one can
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suggest that riding in it is so essential that it deprives the customer of any meaningful
choice in the matter. See, e.g., Williams v. Cox Enterprisees, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 333, 283
S.E.2d 367, 369 (1981) (characterizing as "ludicrous" an argument that race sponsor had
unfair bargaining power because event's popularity and limited availability placed
participants under "enormous pressure to enter it on whatever terms were offered to
them"); Reed v. University of North Dakota, 589 N.W.2d 880, 887 (N.D. 1999) (no unfair
disparity in bargaining power; although provider would not have allowed participation in
race without a waiver, plaintiff was not under any economic or other compulsion).
Nor does the fact that the release is a standard form and that Pearce had no
opportunity to negotiate its terms demonstrate procedural unconscionability. See Ryan,
972 P.2d at 404 (rejecting similar arguments). Pearce argues, however, that he did not
realize that he could suffer injury from the normal operation of the bobsled ride. This
assertion is difficult to comprehend. It is undisputed that Pearce knew he would be
rocketing down a icy, curvy track at 80 miles an hour and experiencing gravitational
pressures of up to 5 times his own body weight. Additionally, by signing the release,
Pearce acknowledged his awareness that serious injury or even death could occur during
the ride.
Pearce also suggests that the release is unconscionable because it does not identify
the specific risk or specific form of alleged negligence that caused his injury. (Brief of
Appellant, p. 42, citing Meese v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720, 724 (Utah
1981)). Meese involved implied, not express or contractual, assumption of the risk.
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Delineation of the particular risk is not required in order to enforce an exculpatory
waiver. See, e.g., Flood v. Young Woman's Christian Association of Brunswick, 398 F.3d
1261, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2005) (applying Georgia law) (where waiver covered risk of
"any" injury that might occur, no requirement that agreement list actual risk faced while
at facility); Dean v. MacDonald, 147 N.H. 263, 786 A.2d 834 (2001) ("the parties need
not have contemplated the precise occurrence that caused the plaintiffs injuries"); Reed
v. University of North Dakota, 589 N.W.2d 880 (N.D. 1999) (by agreeing to assume all
responsibility for injury and not pursue any claims, runner assumed risk of dehydration
and inadequate medical assistance, even though not specified in the release); Skotak v.
Vic Tanny Intern., Inc., 203 Mich. App. 616, 513 N.W.2d 428 (1994) (release barred
claims for lack of available medical assistance even though specific risk was not
mentioned); Madison v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App.3d 589, 250 Cal. Rptr. 299, 307
(1988) (not every possible act of negligence has to be spelled out in release; knowledge
of specific risk is only relevant to implied assumption of the risk, not express
assumption). See also Lee v. Thorpe, 2006 UT 66, 147 P.3d 443 (enforcing waiver of all
tort claims arising out of capture by bounty hunter, even if apprehension was illegal
under Utah law; "Nothing befell Gerald to which he had not consented").7

7

One can only imagine what a release would look like if it had to identify every potential
risk or form of negligence that might occur. Instead of a readable form in which the rider
releases all negligence claims, plain and simple, the release would turn into a pages-long
laundry list of hypothetical scenarios.
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D.

The release is not void on public policy grounds.

Pearce's next contention is that the release violates public policy. Analysis of this
issue must begin with a reminder that the enforcement of contractual obligations is itself
an important policy of this state. Otteson v. Malone, 584 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1978) ("A
written contract duly entered into should be regarded with some sanctity"). As Williston
observes, "public policy requires that parties of full age and competent understanding
must have the greatest freedom of contracting, and contracts, when entered into freely
and voluntarily, must be upheld and enforced by the courts." 5 Williston on Contracts §
12:3 (4th ed.).
The law governing exculpatory clauses in Utah is well established. (See pp. 1617, supra.) Pearce asks this Court to discard this settled jurisprudence and instead adopt
a new test unique to this jurisdiction, namely: "Where a provider of a recreational
activity knows, or should know, of a substantial risk of serious injury which is not an
obvious or inherent risk of the activity, the provider cannot contract around the risk
unless meaningfully disclosed and assumed." (Brief of Appellant, p. 32.)
Pearce acknowledges that no other court has adopted such a standard, but argues
that it is needed because "one might be careless of another's life and limb, if there is no
penalty for carelessness." (Id, p. 35, quoting Hawkins, 2001 UT 94, % 13.) The
underlying premise is flawed, however. An assumption that conscious decisions will be
made to ignore risks if releases are enforceable overlooks the fact that a conscious
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decision to ignore serious risks would not be simple negligence, it would be gross
negligence, and would thus remain actionable regardless of an exculpatory waiver.
Moreover, there is serious question as to the validity of the assumption that
enforcing waivers eliminates a facility's incentive to be careful. See, e.g., R. Heidt, "The
Avid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-protection: When Exculpatory Clauses Should be
Enforced," 38 U.Rich.L.Rev. 381, 471-72 (2004) (refuting suggestion that waivers reduce
incentive for vendor care; arguing that "other concerns than the wish to avoid tort liability
will continue to provide that incentive").

In this case, for example, even with its

exculpatory clause in place, the UAF devoted considerable effort to keeping the track
smooth and clear and the sleds maintained, providing orientation to riders, screening out
passengers with bad backs, etc.
Pearce's construct would essentially render exculpatory agreements meaningless
because they would not bar negligence claims if a provider was negligent in failing to
discover or "meaningfully" disclose the alleged danger—in other words, claims for
negligence would be barred by a release unless the provider was negligent. Pearce's
argument is essentially a request to eliminate exculpatory waivers altogether.
In a related point, Pearce argues that the release "is clearly unenforceable under
four of the six factors" identified in Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383
P.2d 441, 445-46 (1963). No analysis is offered as to the appropriateness of applying
these factors to the release, and doing so would raise a broader question: Why should
courts subject every exculpatory clause to an automatic public policy analysis, as Pearce
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suggests? Vitiating a contract on public policy grounds is supposed to be a rarity.
Enforcement of an otherwise enforceable contract has never been thought of as a case-bycase proposition in Utah.
If substantive restrictions are to be imposed on an entire class of contracts, it is a
matter for the legislature, not the judiciary. See, e.g., Wolf v. Ford, 335 Md. 525, 644
A.2d 522, 531 (1994) ("In the absence of legislation to the contrary, exculpatory clauses
are generally valid, and the public policy of freedom of contract is best served by
enforcing the provisions of the clause"), citing 57A Am.Jur.2d, Negligence § 53 (1989).8
The Utah legislature has chosen not to regulate exculpatory waivers. To the
contrary, it has recognized the presumptive validity of such releases in all but a few
narrow contexts. For example, the legislature has declared that any exculpatory clause in
a product liability case "shall be contrary to public policy and is void." Utah Code Ann.
§78-15-2.
The legislature has likewise declared an exculpatory clause in a trust agreement
"unenforceable to the extent that it: (1) relieves the trustee of liability for breach of trust
committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or the
interest of the beneficiaries; or (2) was inserted by the trustee or fiduciary without
disclosure of its existence and contents." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1008. It has barred
certain indemnification agreements in construction contracts as contrary to public policy

8

Alternatively, any such change should be prospective only, considering that parties in
this state have been induced to provide services in reliance on a long line of
pronouncements from this Court.
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and void. Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-8-1, -2. See also Utah Code Ann. § 13-35-201(l)(e)
(prohibiting certain franchisors from requiring "a release, assignment, waiver, or estoppel
that would: (i) relieve a franchisor from any liability"); Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2c-1809, 1810 (invalidating indemnification agreements in LLC operating agreements that are
inconsistent with statutory standards, which are to be construed "so as to give the
maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract").
Neither the legislature, nor the Constitution, nor prior decisions of this Court
support Pearce's public policy argument. See Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405 (public policy
exceptions should be "narrowly construe[d]"); id. ("A public policy is 'clear' only if
plainly defined by legislative enactments, constitutional standards, or judicial decisions");
American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Utah
law) (refusing to invalidate no-transfer clause in airline contract on public policy
grounds; "we are mindful of Utah's practice of interpreting public policy very
narrowly").
Exculpatory waivers are already scrutinized more closely than insurance policies,
loan agreements, or virtually any other kind of contract. They cannot release claims for
product liability, warranty, gross negligence, intentional acts, or claims by minors. But
they have been held enforceable in all other contexts for 50 years.
Pearce's argument would introduce an inherent unpredictability into contract law
that would paralyze every business and industry that relies on waivers to procure liability
insurance and to stay in business. Passengers would not have to worry about the G-forces
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on a bobsled ride any more because there would be no bobsled ride. As one court
observed:
If a prospective participant wishes to place himself in the competition sufficiently
to voluntarily agree that he will not hold the organizer or sponsor of the event
liable for his injuries, the courts should enforce such agreements. If these
agreements, voluntarily entered into, were not upheld, the effect would be to
increase the liability of those organizing or sponsoring such events to such an
extent that no one would be willing to undertake to sponsor a sporting event.
Clearly, this would not be in the public interest.
Gore v. Tri-County Raceway, Inc., 407 F.Supp. 489 (D. Ala. 1974). See also Heidt, 38
U.Rich.L.Rev. at 381-382 (noting that "the expansion of tort liability since the 1960s has
coincided with a sharp curtailment of the availability of some recreational activities"); G.
Johnson, "Enforceability of Exculpatory Clauses in Hazardous Recreational Activities,"
1998 Utah Bar J. 8 ("If Utah's hazardous recreational industries are to remain viable,
Utah's framework for analyzing and enforcing exculpatory clauses should be consistently
followed. . . . If the language of the exculpatory clause is: (1) written clearly and is
understandable by the average lay person, (2) if the wording of the exculpatory clause is
displayed prominently and in an adequate type size, and (3) if the intent to relieve the
provider of the activity from liability for alleged negligence is clearly and unequivocally
expressed in the contractual provision, our courts should enforce that provision. The
timorous may stay at home.").
Public policy considerations should not invalidate an unambiguous release unless
the activity in question affects the public interest. See Hawkins, 2001 UT 94, ^ 9
("[M]ost courts allow release of liability for prospective negligence, except where there is
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a strong public interest in the services provided"); Russ, 905 P.2d at 905 ("Generally,
parties 'not engaged in public service may properly bargain against liability for harm
caused by their ordinary negligence in performance of contractual duty; but such an
exemption is always invalid if it applies to harm willfully inflicted or caused by gross or
wanton negligence'").
Most courts in the United States follow this approach. See, e.g., Holier v. Dakota
Speedway, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 2000) (waiver did not violate public policy where
activity did not implicate public interest, which usually requires essential or public
service affecting public at large); Moore v. Hartley Motors, Inc., 36 P.3d 628 (Alaska
2001) ("Of particular relevance to this case is the type of service performed and whether
the party seeking exculpation has a decisive advantage in bargaining strength because of
the essential nature of the service"); Plant v. Wilbur, 345 Ark. 487, 47 S.W.3d 889 (2001)
("We are also mindful that numerous jurisdictions have found that releases containing
similar, and sometimes identical language to this one, are not void as against public
policy. The general rationale behind allowing these types of releases in the context of
auto racing is that they involve a very narrow segment of the public, rather than situations
involving a public utility, a common carrier, or a similar entity connected with the public
interest"); Bertotti v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc., 893 F.Supp. 565, 566 (W.D.N.C.
1995) (noting that, in North Carolina and other jurisdictions, "exculpatory contracts
entered in connection with motor sports events do not violate public policy because such
contracts do not involve public interests").
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Courts applying Tunkl likewise decline to invalidate releases in recreational events
because they are "not performing a service of great importance to the public, which is
often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public." Westlye v. Look
Sports, Inc., 17 Cal. App.4th 1715, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 781, 790-91 (1993), and cases cited;
Chauvlier v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings, Inc., 109 Wash. App. 334, 35 P.3d 383, 388
("[A] survey of cases assessing exculpatory clauses reveals that the common
determinative factor for Washington courts has been the services' or activities'
importance to the public").
In any event, the release in this case would be upheld even under the Tunkl factors.
The first factor is whether the contract concerns a business of a type generally thought
suitable for public regulation. Tunkl involved services performed by a public hospital,
obviously an appropriate area for regulation. In this case, the activity was a private
recreational endeavor. Second, Tunkl examined whether the release involved a service of
great importance to the public or which is often a matter of practical necessity for some
members of the public, which again is not applicable here.
The third Tunkl factor is whether the released party is willing to perform the
offered service for any member of the public who seeks it or who meets certain standards.
While the UAF, like any facility, hopes to attract customers, there is no indication in the
record that it was required to accept all potential passengers.

Indeed, had Pearce

informed the UAF that he had a bad back, the undisputed evidence suggests that he
would not have been permitted to ride.
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The fourth Tunkl factor considers whether one party had a decisive advantage in
the offering of the contract because of the essential nature of the services. As noted
above, courts have uniformly rejected such contentions in the recreational context. The
final Tunkl factor evaluates whether the person or property is placed under the control of
the seller of services. The UAF did position the passengers in the sled, and did suggest
that Pearce lean forward in the direction of travel. However, Mr. Pearce was free to
request another position, and affected his positioning in the sled through his response
regarding the strength of his back.
In sum, the trial court's ruling that Paragraph 3 barred Pearce's claims for
negligence was correct under well-settled Utah precedent, and the judgment should be
affirmed.
E.

Pearce's claims are also barred by his assumption of risks in the opening

clause and Paragraph 1 of the release.
Although the Court need not reach this issue in light of Paragraph 3, Pearce's
claims would also be barred by the opening clause of the release, in which Pearce agreed
to assume "all risks," and by Paragraph 1, in which he assumed all inherent risks of the
bobsled ride.
"All risks" means all risks. Moreover, it is undisputed that one of the inherent
risks of the bobsled - one reason it is "the ride of a lifetime" - is that swooshing down a
mountain in a sled at 80 miles per hour generates gravitational forces of up to 5 times the
rider's own body weight. The velocity of the bobsled and the related G-forces are exactly
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what participants want to experience. Pearce concedes that his injury was caused solely
by those G-forces.
The fact that passengers in the rear of the sled experience greater G-forces than
those in the second and third seats (a concept familiar to anyone who has ever played
"crack the whip" in a schoolyard) does not affect the analysis. That someone in the
second or third seat might feel only 3 or 4 Gs does not alter the fact that Pearce
experienced no greater than the 5 Gs of which he had been warned. On this alternative
ground as well, then, the trial court correctly dismissed Pearce's claims.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE EVIDENCE
IN THE RECORD WAS INSUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN A CLAIM
OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE.

The trial court correctly held that the evidence in the record was not sufficient to
maintain a claim for gross negligence.
A.

Pearce misconstrues the trial court's ruling.

Before analyzing this issue, one matter should be dispensed with summarily, and
that is Pearce's contention that the trial court applied an improper standard to the motion
for summary judgment. In his first page of argument, Pearce claims that the trial court
required him to produce "undisputed facts" of gross negligence in order to forestall
summary judgment. (Brief of Appellants, p. 8.) That argument is without merit.
It is true that one small segment of Judge Lubeck's opinion (which also
constituted the order), if read literally, might appear to read as Pearce says. However,
such a reading is not only unfair to the judge, but it also ignores the context and the
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court's analysis, which clearly demonstrate that the court was assessing the gross
negligence in light of the undisputed facts regarding UAF's actions.
The standard for summary judgment is well known. The UAF cited it to the trial
court in its moving papers. (R. 109.) It is clear from the entirety of Judge Lubeck's
memorandum decision that he applied the correct standard.

He did not require

undisputed evidence of gross negligence; he required sufficient evidence of gross
negligence.
B.

The trial court correctly held that Pearce introduced insufficient evidence to

maintain a claim of gross negligence.
The meaning of "gross negligence" is well defined in Utah law because, for many
years before the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, it was the common law
threshold for allowing a punitive damages claim to reach a jury. See Wilson v. Oldroyd,
1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P.2d 759, 765 (1954). Under this Court's precedent, gross negligence
is essentially co-extensive with recklessness:
While the term 'gross9 is constantly used in this connection, many cases explain it
by declaring that the rule of exemplary damages requires negligence in such
degree as to amount to wantonness and positive misconduct, manifesting a
conscious disregard of the rights of others and a reckless indifference to
consequences.
Id. See also Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 193 (Wyo. 1979) (equating gross
negligence to recklessness for purposes of punitive damages) (cited in Behrens v. Raleigh
Hills Hospital Inc., 675 P.2d 1179,1187 (Utah 1983)).
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While intent to injure is not required, the defendant's conduct "must be malicious
or in reckless disregard for the rights of others, although actual intent to cause injury is
not required. That is, the defendant must either know or should know 'that such conduct
would, in a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to another.'" Behrens,
675 P.2d at 1186-87.
Pearce adduced insufficient

evidence that the UAF acted with reckless

indifference toward him. The bobsled track was designed, engineered, and tested in
accord with exacting local and international guidelines.

The UAF adopted and

implemented safety policies and procedures to ensure that the Public Ride Program was
operated in accord with the standards in the industry, and that passengers were informed
of the risks of the ride. The policies and procedures were developed in accord with
similar facilities in Lake Placid and Calgary.
The UAF relied upon the design and engineering experts of the sport's governing
bodies to properly construct, design, test, inspect, and analyze the track. It networked
with other tracks to ensure that its PRP was operated in accord with the standard in the
industry. The bobsled run is exactly the same now as it was at the conclusion of that
process. The slopes are the same. The radii of the curves are the same. The G-forces
generated during the run are the same.
The UAF hired an expert in Public Ride Programs from Canada to operate the
facility. It hired world-class professional drivers. It required passengers to go through an
orientation before being allowed on the ride. It prepared written materials to govern its
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operations. It warned passengers that the ride was aggressive and might generate up to 5
G-forces. It tried to screen out passengers with bad backs and other vulnerabilities.
Those facts are all undisputed, and preclude a claim for gross negligence. See, e.g.,
Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 127 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 1997) (evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate wanton negligence; therefore, exculpatory waiver barred
plaintiffs9 claims); Flood, 398 F.3d at 1266-67 (although plaintiff claimed that defendant
was negligent in several respects, evidence was insufficient to maintain claim of gross
negligence).
Pearce attempts, however, to raise the specter of gross negligence in a couple of
ways. First, he lists a string of specific duties allegedly breached by the UAF, e.g., duty
to ensure proper construction, duty to discover dangerous characteristics of the ride, etc.
His experts likewise set forth various alleged breaches of duty.
Whether these individual duties would in fact apply, and/or whether they were
breached, is immaterial. They are all simply variations of negligence. Plaintiffs often
hedge their bets by arguing a multitude of duties that were breached by a defendant: The
defendant failed to keep a proper lookout. The defendant was driving too fast for the
conditions. The defendant failed to apply his brakes in time. All of these duties might be
breached in a single car accident, but that does not transform the defendant's conduct into
gross negligence. It is the defendant's state of mind, not the number of duties he
allegedly breached, that is dispositive.
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This is not a case where the UAF acted on a whim, threw a bobsled run together
and invited the public for a quick slide down the mountain. It was a carefully designed
track, used in the 2002 Olympic Winter Games, and then made available to the public.
Nonetheless, Pearce launches various criticisms at the UAF. For example, he criticizes
the UAF for reviewing its injury reports once a year instead of as they occur. While the
review might not have occurred as frequently as Pearce would advocate, it is undisputed
that the UAF proactively conducted injury reviews to detect patterns or concerns, that
PRP statistics were reviewed and analyzed by the General Manager, and that as a result
of such reviews, the UAF has taken specific measures in an attempt to reduce track
injuries.
Pearce9s brief also argues that the bobsled run should have been tested with
ordinary members of the public, and that the UAF's experience was based on highly
conditioned Olympic athletes. This allegation, however, again states nothing more than
negligence. There is no suggestion that the general public is subjected to greater forces
than Olympic athletes; such an assertion would defy the laws of physics. Under Pearce's
theory, the most that could be said is that, although it attempted to screen out passengers
with back and neck conditions, the UAF might not have fully accounted for differences in
the public's ability to deal with G-forces, which would constitute simple negligence at
best. Moreover, Pearce ignores the undisputed fact that the bobsleds purchased for the
PRP had been modified for public use, with rollover protection, handles, fins for speed
reduction, etc.
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Pearce also claims awareness by the UAF that, "in just the last three months three
persons had suffered serious spinal injuries, including compression fractures." (Brief of
Appellant, p. 3, citing R. 162 and Appx. 20-26.) On this point, he relies on three reports
of injury by ride participants, which he also attaches to appendix on appeal.9 A review of
those incident reports reveals only the following:

(1) one participant in the fourth

position who reported a back strain but refused medical treatment; (2) one participant,
position unknown, who reported a compression of the spine and did not receive medical
treatment; and (3) one participant, position unknown, who initially reported feeling a
"jolt" and a "pop."10
None of the incident reports indicate, let alone confirm, back fractures. Moreover,
only one of the three incident reports indicates that the fourth position was involved.
Considering that passengers are specifically warned that back injuries may occur from
high G-forces, it would not be surprising that some passengers did experience discomfort.
Pearce also claims that the UAF did not review incident reports from the prior
operator, the Salt Lake Organizing Committee. That is a mischaracterization of the
record. The actual testimony was that, in spite of a diligent effort, UAF personnel could
not locate records of injury reports from the committee. (R. 162.)

The UAF objected below to consideration of these reports as inadmissible hearsay. (R.
161.)
10

A supplemental report on the third participant, dated after the plaintiffs accident,
identified the participant's injury more specifically as a compression fracture.
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Pearce claims that the UAF "fail[ed] to undertake any measures to prevent injuries
in the fourth seat." That characterization, again, is not supported by the record. It is
undisputed that UAF personnel attempted to screen out passengers with bad backs, and
believed they were doing the right thing by instructing the fourth passenger to lean
forward in the direction of travel and grasp the handle. Whether they were correct or not
is not the issue; there simply is no evidence that they knew better yet consciously ignored
the risk.11
The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that the UAF dedicated substantial
resources to ensure that it was operating in accord with the industry standard. Out of
hundreds of operational details, Pearce singles out a few elements that he claims were
mishandled. There simply is no gross negligence claim here.
Pearce argues, however, that testimony of his experts creates an issue of fact.
There are two problems with this contention.

First, although otherwise admissible

testimony is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact, U.R.E. 704(a), "[nevertheless, opinions that 'tell the jury what result to
reach' or 'give legal conclusions' continue to be impermissible under rule 704." State v.
Davis, 2007 UT App 13, f 15, 155 P3d 909, and cases cited; Steffenson v. Smith's
Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Utah 1993); Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d
11

Pearce's brief says "[t]his injury was entirely preventable." (Brief of Appellant, p. 4.)
No record citation is provided, and the statement is not supported by the record. Pearce's
expert testified only that the risk of spinal injury could have been "reduced" if the fourth
rider assumed a more upright posture, pushing off the handles and not flexing the spine.
(id.)
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1225 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) (testimony that party was
"negligent" was impermissible legal opinion).
Whether the evidence supports submission of the case to a jury on the question of
gross negligence is a legal determination for the Court, i.e., the Court must determine
whether the facts as admitted by defendant for purposes of is motion below would
warrant the giving of a jury instruction as to gross negligence. An expert may opine as to
whether a defendant breached the standard of care in a particular instance, but the experts
in this case were not familiar with - nor did they address - the standard of care in the
bobsled industry.

(R. 161.)

Neither expert offered any analyses of the UAF's

compliance or failure to comply with the applicable standard of care, either regarding
warnings, the bobsleds, or operation of the track. The trial court correctly held that no
genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to gross negligence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, appellee Utah Athletic Foundation respectfully
requests the Court to affirm the trial court's judgment.
DATED this V ^ d a y of May, 2007.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

Karra J. Porter W
Ruth A. Shapiro
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit A

RULING and ORDER, September 14, 2006

Exhibit B

AGREEMENT TO USE FACILITIES OF OLYMPIC PARKS OF UTAH

Exhibit A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JAMES PEARCE,
RULING and ORDER
Plaintiff,
Case No. 040500322
vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
UTAH ATHLETIC FOUNDATION dba
UTAH WINTER SPORTS PARK, and
OSCAR PODAR,

DATE: September 14, 2006

Defendants.

The above matter came before the court on September 11,
2006, for oral argument on Utah Athletic Foundation's (UAF or
defendant) motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff was present

through Fred R. Silvester and Spencer C. Siebers and defendant
was present through Ruth A. Shapiro.
on May 2, 2006.

Defendant filed this motion

Plaintiff filed an opposition response on Ma^

31, 2006. Defendant filed a reply on June 8, 2006.

A request to

submit was filed by defendant on June 8, 2006. Oral argument was
scheduled and held September 11, 2006.

The court took the matter

under advisement.

The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties, heard
oral argument, and concludes as follows.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint May 10, 2004, alleging he was

00C181

injured on a bobsled attraction operated by defendant in
February, 2003.
defendant.

He alleged two causes of negligent action by

An amended complaint was filed, by stipulation, on

February 25, 2005.

It added a defendant Podar and alleged two

claims of negligence (negligence, gross negligence) against the
UAF and added a claim of breach of warranty and claimed Podar was
strictly liable and was negligent in selling the bobsleds to UAF.

ARGUMENTS
Defendant UAF moves for summary judgment alleging the
negligence claims are barred by a contract executed by plaintiff.
Plaintiff's breach of warranty claim is barred because there was
no warranty by defendant.
Defendant claims as undisputed facts that plaintiff suffered
a lumbar fracture while riding a public bobsled in February 2003.
Defendant is an organization that oversees the Utah Olympic Park
and other venues.

The ride, used in the 2002 Winter Olympics,

was open to the public in 1997, in what is called a Public Ride
Program (PRP) . After the 2002 Olympics UAF assumed ownership and
operation of the bobsled track. Many contractors and engineers
participated in the construction of the bobsled run for the State
of Utah.

An international federation ensures a track is built

and meets design criteria. This process, called "homologization"
includes many scientific specifications.

The operation of the
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truck involves a general manager, a director of operations, a
track supervisor, a control tower operator, track technician and
crew, PRP starters, passenger supervisor, bobsled technicians and
a safety/compliance coordinator.

Maintenance goes on during each

day of operation. The track is inspected daily by certified
personnel who walk the track, and it is re-inspected and recertified if there is a 20 minute gap in sled activity. As to the
PRP, the sleds used are four-man sleds, with a driver and three
passengers. The driver in the PRP also does the braking. Worldclass drivers are utilized in the PRP as drivers.

UAF developed

procedures for the PRP, and those include instructions to
personnel and a "Frequently Asked Questions'' sheet for
participants.

In arriving at procedures as to how to best advise

the participants, the only other tracks in North America (there
are two others, in Calgary and Lake Placid) were consulted. A one
hour orientation, including a video and oral presentation, is
required before participants may ride.

The presentations explain

the nature of the ride and the risks involved. Each rider is
required to sign a Release.

The fourth position in the bobsled

is the most intense and riders are so advised and warned.
Plaintiff is a mechanical engineer and active in outdoor sports
activities.

Plaintiff signed the Release and saw the

instructional video and heard the oral presentation.

Plaintiff

knew what G-force entailed. Plaintiff told track personnel he had
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no back problems but in fact had suffered a ruptured disk in
1997.
Defendant claims the Release excludes claims based on
negligence.

Contracts that clearly and unequivocally preclude

claims for negligence are enforceable.

This Release states this

activity may put the rider at risk of serious Injury or illness.
The Release states that UAF is discharged from liability whether
caused by negligence of UAF or otherwise.
As to gross negligence, the court may conclude as a matter
of law the case does not rise to the leveL of gross negligence.
Gross negligence is often involved in a cLaim for punitive
damages, and that requires willfulness or conduct that manifests
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of,
the rights of others.

Here, the track was designed according to

international guidelines, it was certified by the governing
international body, it is operated with proper safety policies
that comport with the two other bobsled tracks in North America,
the PRP program addresses the risks and gives appropriate
information and guidance. This is an inherently risky activity
and an accident occurred due to fast speeds of a heavy sled on
ice.

Any failures by UAF are mere negligence, not gross

negligence, and UAF denies any failures and denies negligence.
As to the breach of warranty claim it must fail because no
warranty, express or implied, was made by UAF.

A service was
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ptovided and there is and was no warranty.
disclaimed any warranties.
Release in this case.

The Release also

There was no contract except the

No result was guaranteed. Any implied

warranty is fulfilled by the exercise of customary or reasonable
11 involved.

In opposition plaintiff argues the fourth position is
dangerous and defendant knew it as two injuries had recently
occurred to riders seated in that position. No special testing
was conducted nor were special warnings given about that
position.
Plaintiff contests some of the facts dealing with the
adjectives and superlatives of defendant's claimed facts.

There

was no "extensive" testing, no one hour orientation, and
plaintiff did not "understand" the ride. Plaintiff disputes that
he was given any special instructions or warning concerning the
fourth position. Plaintiff claims he did not intend to release
defendant from liability.
As additional facts, plaintiff claims he signed the document
but did not know what it was, and he was not told and did not
understand it was a release of liability. The orientation was 15
minutes.

Expert testimony will show that by leaning forward as

he was instructed, the fourth rider increases his exposure to
compression fractures.

UAF did not undertake any study
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concerning the fourth position rider. The ratio of injury for the
fourth iseat passenger is 1 to 66, showing the gross nature of the
neglif»«.
Plaintiff argues the Release does not bar the negligence
claim because he was injured not by the inherent risk of the ride
but because of the nature of the fourth position, which risk
plaintiff was not aware of and did not assume. Falling out,
tipping over, and hitting something are inherent in the high
speed ride, but not suffering a compression fracture because of
G-force in the fourth position, coupled with the erroneous advice
about how to position oneself. To assume the risk, one must know
of the risk, and voluntarily consent tc assume it. An inherent
risk is one that cannot be alleviated by the use of reasonable
care.

Here, the negligence of the provider of service is not

inherent. If a risk can be eliminated by the use of ordinary
care, it is not an inherent risk.
Other parts of the Release, part II], only release defendant
from liability arising from assumed risks, those named in Part I.
Releases are not favored, and it must be explicit and unequivocal
and unambiguous.
This Release only releases UAF from assumed risk.

This is

said to be ambiguous and the narrower interpretation reflects the
intent of the parties.

The assumed risks are named in Part I of

the release, such as collision, falling out or tipping over.
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Inherent risks are assumed, but that does not include negligence.
In part III negligence claims are waived, and so the only
consistent interpretation is that negligence involving assumed
risks are waived.

The fourth seat risk could be eliminated or

alleviated, and thus it is not an inherent risk.
The Release does not meet the test of explicitness and is
not clearly understood.

It is confusing and subject to

misinterpretation.
Further, it is unconscionable as defendant argues its
meaning.

It would allow defendant to escape all liability for

anything, something which is against public policy.

Where UAF

knew, or should have known, of a risk, and did not advise others
but attempts to waive liability for such, public policy is
violated. There was here no meeting of the minds, thus no
contract. Plaintiff was not told of the risks of this position.
As to gross negligence, there are questions of fact dealing
with whether the ride was properly designed and constructed,
whether UAF knew of the unreasonable risks, whether there were
any dangerous conditions, and what warnings needed to be given.
What dynamics of the ride were known, what physical testing and
what patron feedback occurred are factual questions that are not
without dispute, and those all contribute to gross negligence.
The breach of warranty claim exists as defendant warrants it
has used reasonable care.

Defendant held itself out as offering
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a safe ride for the public, and plaintiff has evidence reasonable
care was not used.

In reply defendant argues that plaintiff's characterizations
of meaning are not disputes of fact. Other disputes are
discussed.
Defendant argues the issue is whether the release is legally
enforceable.

Defendant claims the Release is clear in that it

releases defendant from its negligence, among other things. Other
similar releases have been upheld, they meet the test of enforce
ability. The question presented by plaintiff that he did not
understand the Release is irrelevant.
enforce ability.

The question is one of

Plaintiff clearly knew he could be hurt and he

released defendant.

All plaintiff argues is that he knew he

could be hurt, but he did not know he couLd be hurt in the way he
was in fact hurt.
Plaintiff assumed the inherent risk of the activity.
Inherent risks also include those risks a participant wishes to
confront.

Here, the speed and G-force ace those features of the

ride that plaintiff desired to participate in or experience. The
danger involved here does not deal with the manner in which the
injury could occur, but merely that an injury (or death) could
occur.
There has been no credible evidence of gross negligence
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presented by plaintiffs

Hfe opinions of the m^m^s

of plaintiff

are legal conclusions, and are not entitled to weight as they
cannot opine on the question of negligence. The court is to make
a legal determination of whether there has been gross negligence.
There certainly is no evidence of malice or wilfulness and
plaintiff claims none.

At most mere negligence is shown.

The warranty claim must fail, as the cases relied on by
plaintiff are duties from statute.

DISCUSSION
It seems to the court that plaintiff has presented no
evidence that would allow a jury to determine there was any gross
negligence.

Defendant defines gross negligence as "the failure

to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness
to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences
that may result." Atkin

Wright

Telephone,

(Utah

109 P.2D 330

& Miles
1985).

v. Mountain

States

Plaintiff defines it from

the Restatement, section 500, arguing it is a lesser standard.
That section provides:
NN

. . . conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of
another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an
act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or
having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable
man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that
such risk is substantially greater than that which is
necessary to make his conduct negligent."
9
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Whatever definition is used B p M t a R M C t , the court does not
believe plaintiff has set forth sufficient evidence of gross
negligence.

There must be undisputed facts in evidence relating

to each element of the claim before a party may prevail.
Examining the burden of proof plaintiff would bear, the court
cannot state there are undisputed facts that would show he is
entitled to relief under a theory of gross negLigence. Here,
whatever definition of gross negligence LS used, the court cannot
conclude as a matter of law that gross negligence could be
proven. The court is not weighing evidence, and it is giving
all inferences due to plaintiff. Whatever disputes exist as to
just what UAF knew before February 2003, It appears at best for
plaintiff that there were two injuries to other riders, and it
was not revealed those other participants were in the fourth
position, nor that a fractured back was tie result. Thusr
plaintiff's claim that UAF did improper research as to the
effects of the fourth posit Lon, did not ivarn others, and failed
to use other means to insure a safe ride appear without merit to
the court in terms of establishing gross negligence.
At most, such failures by defendant to investigate and warn
would be negligence. Of course the general rule is that because
negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the
facts, which is properly done by juries lather than judges,
"summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the

10

000190

clearest instances." Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P. 2d 182,
183 (Utah 1991)."

Here, the doctrine of gross negligence would

seem to require the same standard.

From the evidence before the

court there is simply no way in which the court can conclude
otherwise than that there has been no gross negligence shown and
such could not be shown.
Experts were hired to design the track, and it meets all
specifications for such a track from all entities dealing with
such facilities.

The expert opinions of plaintiff do not opine

on the standard of care in such an industry.
no wilfulness shown or alleged.

There is certainly

There is no credible evidence of

gross negligence as a matter of law.

Here there are some disputes about some facts, but the court
determines those disputes are not over material facts.

The court

cannot envision that it matters whether the "briefing" or
instructional period given to plaintiff was an hour as defendant
asserts or 15 minutes as plaintiff asserts. There are other such
disputes but they do not foreclose summary judgment.
Similarly, whether plaintiff "understood" the Release is
not material,

He signed the Release and the document indicates

it should not be signed unless understood. The Release is
specific in its instructions to the participants that the
participants should not sign the Release unless it has been read
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and undersWHf

The court does not read the Release as plaintiff urges.
Plaintiff in essence contends that the listed dangers in Part I
are the only dangers, inherent risks, thab he waived in Part III.
The court disagrees.
The Release does not indicate any and all hazards that may
be encountered.

Plaintiff's argument is not availing because the

Release is clear and states that the ride involves many inherent
risks and dangers, and participation puts the participant at risk
of serious injury or illness or death.

Some dangers are Listed,

stating they include but are not limited to, collision, weather
and variations in terrain, accidents b^ other participants,
failure to follow safety procedures or stay in control, and
limits or defects in the facilities. The Release states bhe
participant is aware the UAF cannot and does not guarantee
safety.

The Release then states the participant freely accepts

and fully assumes the risk of property damage, illness, severe
personal injury or even death by using the facilities, "not only
in the ways described above, but also jn ways that are unknown
and unexpected, even if I . . . follow the instruct
advice.,, Plaintiff's arguments may have some merit if the list of
"inherent risks'' stated it was an exclusive list and, for
example, these 8 things are the only 8 things that may go wrong.
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The Release, however, states that the participant understands
many, unnamed things may go wrong resulting in injury and the
participant waives recovery concerning any risk.
To the court, plaintiff's arguments that the risk of the
fourth position were not explained and reasonable care was not
taken to protect against injuries is covered by the last phrase
of Part I of the Release. The Release explains there are dangers,
some named and some not, and that participants may be hurt in
certain ways mentioned, or in unknown ways.

While it does not

specifically state that the fourth position may be the most
dangerous, even if that was known to UAF, reasonable caution and
care and the duty involved do not require that EVERY POSSIBLE
means of injury be explained in detail.
explicit and broad.

The warnings were

There are countless and innumerable ways one

could imagine being hurt on such a ride, from falling out to ice
chunks falling off the run and hitting the participants in the
head to driver error to falling structures and on and on.

Not

all of those hazards in such a ride could be explained and
listed.

The assumption clause covered all risks, not merely

those named.

It is not reasonable to expect any provider to list

all possible means of possible injury.

Risks were explained

fully, in bold type.
Whether UAF was aware of the fourth position risks or not,
whether UAF had done sufficient research, and so on, are not
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determinative as it did not amount to gioss negligence.
for negligence were then waited in Part I]I.

Claims

No evidence has

been presented that shows there was anything other than full
disclosure that dangers were involved, some known and named and
some unknown.
The Release in Part III then states again that UAF is not an
insurer of conduct, and to the fullest extent permitted by law,
the participant waives any claims of liability of any action
whatsoever arising out of the activity related to any damage,
loss, or injury, including death, that may be sustained arising
out of the use of the facility, whether caused by the negligence
of UAF or otherwise.
Again, not every possible hazard is explained in detail but
in a broad way, and the Release is intent LonalLy broad and covers
negligence, and the participant agrees not to maintain any action
even if UAF is negligent and that negligence results in injury.
Here, injury occurred and even if there was negligence in UAF's
alleged failure to properly study the fourth position and in
failing to properly warn against the fourth position hazard, that
negligence was waived.
The court does not see that such a Release is against public
policy.

This activity is obviously, from a common sense

standpoint, dangerous.

It is fast and is usually done by

""professionals," that is, Olympic athletes. The warnings clearly
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state speeds of over 80 miles per hour may be achieved. Whether
such a ride should be made available to the public is not for the
court to determine.

The question is, may a provider of such a

ride protect itself against such claims as plaintiff brings by
having participants sign a Release that the participant may be
hurt but will not assert claims against UAF.

The court believes

the Release is enforceable and valid.
The risks were assumed.

The ride is obviously and clearly

dangerous and injury may occur.

Injury did occur. The court

agrees with UAF that plaintiff understood that, he just did not
know the manner and means by which he may be injured.

At to the breach of warranty claim, the court also agrees
with UAF. There is no implied warranty involved and no statute or
regulation creates one and the Release does not create one
expressly, or by implication.

There is a contract, which

specifically states defendant is NOT an insurer of the safety of
the participants.

That is sufficient to demonstrate UAF does not

warrant a safe ride.

Again, risks are explained, including

death, and to a fair minded person that may or may not create a
situation meriting a second thought about participating in the
ride.

The only warranty that could be involved in such a

situation is that the customary and reasonable skill in the area
of the activity will be exercised. Whether that customary skill
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I?l^f#xercised is not determinativer as the discussion above as to
waiver of negligence claims covers this warranty if it existed as
to any negligent conduct.

The motion of UAF for summary judgment is GRANTED.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.
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Exhibit B

AGREbn/IENT TO USE FACILITIES OF OLYMPIC PAR..o OF UTAH
OLYMPIC PARKS

^JPPF-

IMPORTANT

THIS IS A LEGAL DOCUMENT, PLEASE READ IN FULL AND UNDERSTAND

BEFORE SIGNING

You/your minor child (if applicable) may be hurt using the facilities and equipment of the Olympic Parks of Utah, which include the Utah
Olympic Park, the Utah Olympic Oval and Soldier Hollow (the "Sports Facilities"). If you are unwilling to assume all the risks of your/your
minor child's use of the Sports Facilities, DO NOT sign this document, in which case you/your minor child will NOT be authorized to use the
Sports Facilities, and you will be refunded any monies you paid to use the Sports Facilities. If you sign this document BUT make any
alterations to it, you are NOT authorized to use the Sports Facilities.
1 Assumptions of Risks. I, for myself or as the parent/legal guardian of the participating minor child whose name is listed below ("Participant"),
wish to use the Sports Facilities and may engage in one or more sports, including without limitation alpine, nordic and freestyle ski jumping,
snowboardmg (including freestyle jumping), rocket sled, bobsled, skeleton, luge, open slope luge (and any wheeled versions of such equipment), cross
country skiing (and any wheeled versions of such equipment), biathalon, speed skating, hockey, curling, and related use of training equipment
including without limitation trampoline, spotting rig equipment, pool, roller jump, bungee rig and push track, air rifles, hockey sticks, pucks, curling
stones (collectively, the aSportsM) I understand that the Sports are high-speed action and adventure sports that involve many inherent risks and
dangers, and that using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports may put me/my minor child at risk of serious iniury or illness These dangers
include but are not limited to use of ski lifts and tows, collision with structures and devices, risk-creating weather conditions and variations in terrain,
accidents by other users of the Sports Facilities, failure to follow safety procedures, or to stay within ability or control, limits or defects in the Sports
Facilities I am also aware that hazards may exist throughout the Sports Facilities, may be unmarked and occur without warning, and that helmets,
safety equipment, proficiency checks, supervision and enforcement of rules do not and cannot guarantee my/my minor child's safety I am/my minor
child is able to perform the essential functions required to use the Sports Facilities and participate in the Sports and I am/my minor child is freely and
voluntarily participating in the Sports and the use of the Sports Facilities I REPRESENT AND WARRANT THAT I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD
THIS DOCUMENT, AM OF SOUND MIND, HAVE LEGAL AUTHORITY, AND FREELY ACCEPT AND FULLY ASSUME THE RISK THAT l/MY
MINOR CHILD CAN SUFFER PROPERTY DAMAGE, ILLNESS, SEVERE PERSONAL INJURY OR EVEN DEATH BY USING THE SPORTS
FACILITIES OR PARTICIPATING IN THE SPORTS, not only the ways described above, but also in ways that are unknown and unexpected, even if I
follow/my minor child follows instructions or advice
2 Consent to Medical Treatment, Consent to Use of Images, Etc. If I am unable to consent at the time, due to injury, illness or absence, I hereby
consent to administration of first aid and other emergency medical treatment for such injury or illness that occurs during my/my minor child's use of the
Sports Facilities or participation in the Sports I have/my minor child has adequate health insurance or resources to cover the costs of treatment in
case of any such injury or illness I agree to refrain/cause my minor child to refrain from and not to be impaired by the use of alcohol or any controlled
substance (except as medically authorized) while using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports I grant to the Olympic Parks of Utah ("UAF")
and its assigns the right to use, reproduce, display, distribute and make derivative works, in any and all media, of my/my minor child's voice and
likeness recorded while using the Sports Facilities or participating in the Sports and any biographical information furnished by me/my minor child to the
UAF
3 Waiver, Release and Indemnification I understand and agree that the UAF is not an insurer of my/my minor child s conduct TO THE FULLEST
EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, I HEREBY RELEASE, WAIVE, COVENANT NOT TO SUE, AND DISCHARGE THE UAF AND ALL OF ITS
TRUSTEES DIRECTORS, MANAGERS, OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, VOLUNTEERS, AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES (COLLECTIVELY, THE
"RELEASEES") FROM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY, CLAIMS, DEMANDS AND CAUSES OF ACTION WHATSOEVER ARISING OUT OF OR
RELATED TO ANY LOSS, DAMAGE, OR INJURY, INCLUDING DEATH, THAT MAY BE SUSTAINED BY ME/MY MINOR CHILD OR LOSS OR
DAMAGE TO ANY PROPERTY BELONGING TO ME/MY MINOR CHILD, WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES OR
OTHERWISE ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO MY/MY MINOR CHILD S USE OF THE SPORTS FACILITIES OR PARTICIPATION IN THE
SPORTS I ALSO AGREE THAT, IN THE EVENT THAT ANY PERSON BRINGS ANY CLAIM OR ACTION INDIVIDUALLY OR ON BEHALF OF MY
MINOR CHILD, RELATED TO ANY INJURY OR LOSS SUFFERED BY MY MINOR CHILD AS A RESULT OF MY MINOR CHILD'S USE OF THE
SPORTS FACILITIES OR PARTICIPATION IN THE SPORTS, THAT I WILL INDEMNIFY THE RELEASEES AGAINST SUCH CLAIMS INCLUDING
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY FEES I AGREE THAT THIS DOCUMENT SHALL BIND MY GUARDIAN, ASSIGNS, HEIRS, ADMINISTRATORS AND
EXECUTORS FOREVER
In the event any one or more of the provisions contained in this Agreement shall for any reason be held to be invalid, illegal or
unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality or unenforceability shall not affect the validity of any other provision hereof and this
Agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal or unenforceable provision were not contained herein

Date of Birth:

Name..
FULL NAME OF

Parent/Guardian MUST sign below
IF Participant is younger than 18
Circle how related to Participant Parent /Guardian

PARTICIPANT
PRINT NAME OF PARENT/GUARDIAN

Signature:,

. Today's Date:.
SIGNATURE

OF

PARTICIPANT

Street
Address*
MAILING ADDRESS OF PARTICIPANT

.Date
SIGNATURE OF PARENT/GUARDIAN

_City:_
.State:
_Zip:
(or Parent/Guardian if Participant is younger than 18)

_Country:_

EMERGENCY CONTACT NAME:
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lisyjjr-
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